The Design process
March 13, 2018The Design process
March 13, 2018Influence of Organized Crime on Public Participation in Brazil
Isadora Tenório de Araujo
Paloma Chuquín Alarcón
Participatory planning has gained widespread acceptance among scholars and practitioners as a method for creating more effective and inclusive policies. Also known as citizen participation, it emphasizes the active involvement of citizens in the formulation of urban projects and public policies, a critical step towards inclusive governance. A lot has been written about the challenges associated with this method, including issues related to communication, timelines, community engagement, and power imbalances. While these are important discussions for making participation processes more democratic, much of the existing research overlooks territories in developing countries where the presence of organized crime networks adds an additional and critical layer of complexity. In this regard, Brazil offers a striking case. According to the 2023 Organized Crime Index, it ranks 13th in the category of mafia-style groups (clearly named under the category of criminal groups with territorial control), among eight other Latin American countries, also in the top thirteen (Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2023).
While Brazil’s legal framework mandates citizen participation in the development of each city’s master plan - as per the constitution of 1988- the widespread influence of organized crime is one of the most important factors affecting the process by undermining both community dynamics and political structures.
Brazil and organized Crime
In Brazil, organized crime and violence are deeply intertwined. Rio de Janeiro is a notable case, as it is considered the centre of organized crime groups, which later spread across the country. In the city, violence is fuelled by three main actors: (1) drug trafficking factions fighting for territorial control; (2) militias that evolved from vigilante groups into criminal organizations, currently involved in extortion, drug trafficking, and illegal taxation of essential services; and (3) government forces whose operations often result in collateral damage, including the deaths of innocent favela residents (Deadly Rio De Janeiro: Armed Violence and the Civilian Burden | ACLED, 2023).
In contrast to Rio’s multi-faceted violence, São Paulo, while statistically safer, faces a different challenge: the dominance of the First Capital Command (Primeiro Comando da Capital - PCC), the largest organized crime group in South America. The PCC operates with a high degree of sophistication, controlling sectors such as fuel distribution, waste management, legal gold mining, real estate, and transportation. Additionally, the PCC and Rio’s criminal gangs have begun to exert political influence in smaller municipalities by supporting candidates in exchange for favours that facilitate their criminal activities (Szpacenkopf, 2025).
Public Participation amid Organized Crime
The absence of effective government institutions and the lack of basic public services create opportunities for organized crime to thrive. In Brazil, organized crime has started influencing elections in municipalities where government presence is weak or non-existent. In these areas, gangs exert their power through two main mechanisms: corrupting government functions and influencing local communities.
The first mechanism involves the infiltration of local government and law enforcement institutions. In municipalities where mayors are elected with the support of criminal organizations, public services—such as healthcare, education, housing, infrastructure, and local policing—often align with the economic interests of those groups. At the same time, democratic actors—such as media, unions, and lawyers—face unrestricted harassment from these organizations. (Tank, 2024, p. 35). The police often play a dual role, either being complicit with the criminal groups or escalating the violence to assert dominance. Such violence disproportionally targets marginalized populations as criminals, which often results in fatal consequences. In 2017, Brazilian police were responsible for the killing of 5,144 individuals (Human Rights Watch, 2019). Official police narratives frequently justify these killings as part of the "war on drugs," often shifting blame onto the victims. But a closer look exposes deeper systemic issues, such as underlying racism, discrimination, and the criminalization of poverty.
The second mechanism involves the integration of organized crime into communities by filling institutional gaps. In areas with weak government presence, criminal groups provide essential services - including employment, security, healthcare, and food- strengthening their ties with local populations. Consequently, these communities frequently develop greater trust in criminal groups than in governmental institutions, further undermining the state’s legitimacy and effectiveness. (Tank, 2024, p. 35). Magaloni et al. (2020) argue that criminal groups can be well organized and capable of maintaining certain degree of order and stability in the territories they control, they argue “Disorganized crime might be worse for the community than organized crime, especially when the state has poor control of its security forces and when these security forces lack legitimacy among the community”(Magaloni et al., 2020, p. 3) This dynamic resembles the behaviour of mafia-style organizations, where the “benefits” provided to the community are a way to justify or obscure the violence and exploitation perpetrated by the group itself.
The largest favelas in Rio de Janeiro are subject to this type of domination. In these territories, political participation is severely constrained by the risks associated with opposing organized crime groups. Favela residents, predominantly working-class and marginalized, find their ability to defend their interests further restricted by the influence of these groups. This dynamic exacerbates existing social inequalities and reinforces their exclusion from political engagement.
Participatory Processes in Brazil and Their Limitations
Genuinely effective participatory processes remain rare in Brazil. In territories not dominated by organized crime, some municipalities have achieved notable success. The cities of Vinhedo (2005–2007) and Jundiaí (2014–2016), both in the state of São Paulo, conducted revisions of their master plans through processes that have been recognized as exemplary by experts. These initiatives employed rapid surveys (e.g., through utility bills) and more detailed questionnaires in schools to identify residents’ priorities. Technical assessments were followed by governmental proposals and counterproposals from various civil society groups. Open forums facilitated consensus-building, with final decisions made by elected representatives. The entire process was documented and made publicly available, enabling citizens to understand and monitor the consequences of planning decisions (De Freitas & De Melo Bueno, 2018).
The effect of organized crime on political participation is further illuminated by Tank's (2024) comparative research on Belo Horizonte and Rio de Janeiro. The study reveals a significant divergence: in Belo Horizonte, where criminal governance is less consolidated, favela residents exhibit robust engagement in local political processes. The city established municipal councils that have enabled citizens to engage actively in deliberative forums, facilitating direct interaction with public authorities and contributing to the formulation of public policy. The inclusion of favela residents in state institutions has improved their access to basic social rights. This stands in sharp contrast to Rio de Janeiro, where the strong influence of organized crime and its relationship with government officials appears to diminish residents' political activity, resulting in markedly lower levels of participation.
One notable exception is the Socio-Spatial Plan for Rocinha, one of Rio de Janeiro’s largest favelas, characterized by territorial control by criminal factions. This plan stands out as a rare example of participatory planning in a context of violence. Conducted between 2006 and 2008, it benefited from an unusual degree of political support at the time. Initial contact with the project coordinator dates back to 1995, initiated by Rocinha’s residents’ association. Nevertheless, the plan has yet to be fully implemented, largely due to successive changes in municipal and state administrations (Andrade, 2021).
Lastly, the Complexo do Alemão, also an area characterized by high levels of violence, presents a distinct case. Although no official participatory planning process was implemented, the Plano de Ação Popular do CPX (CPX People's Action Plan) was developed collaboratively by residents, universities, and NGOs. This plan outlines public policy demands extending through 2030. It is particularly noteworthy that the CPX People's Action Plan does not refer to drug trafficking or organized crime, despite their evident presence and influence in the area. This omission may reflect a range of factors, including concerns over reinforcing negative stereotypes, discomfort with addressing the issue publicly, fear of retaliation, and a widespread perception that state interventions against crime are often ineffective or even detrimental to the local population (Pinheiro & Sales, 2022).
Conclusion
In many developing countries, the influence of criminal organizations profoundly impacts the practice of public participation. The case of Brazil illustrates how even when legal frameworks mandate citizen engagement, organized crime can significantly distort or suppress participatory processes.
Although there are documented cases of good practices in participatory planning—even in areas controlled by parallel powers—these are isolated instances and remain the exception rather than the rule, and are heavily dependent on favourable political conditions and strong institutional support. They demonstrate that meaningful citizen participation is possible, but fragile, rare, and vulnerable to political shifts.
Urban planning must urgently confront the realities of territories governed by criminal powers. The common assumption that increased policing alone can resolve structural challenges is not only inadequate but often counterproductive. Rather, addressing this issue requires a deep understanding of how criminal organizations operate and how their influence is shaped by specific local conditions—such as unemployment, weak institutions, and service delivery gaps.
Designing participatory mechanisms capable of operating effectively despite criminal interference is not merely desirable; it is imperative for achieving meaningful and effective policy implementation. However, such mechanisms must be embedded within broader, multi-level interventions that tackle the social, economic, and political roots of organized crime. Only then can participatory planning become both resilient and transformative in contexts marked by systemic violence.
References:
Andrade, P. R. (2021). Uma aproximação antropológica ingoldiana na elaboração do Plano Diretor Socioespacial da Rocinha – RJ (2005 a 2007). DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals). https://doaj.org/article/f0540d00dd6744949fadd86062352689
De Freitas, E. L. H., & De Melo Bueno, L. M. (2018). Processos participativos para elaboração de Planos Diretores Municipais: inovações em experiências recentes. Urbe Revista Brasileira De Gestão Urbana, 10(2), 304–321. https://doi.org/10.1590/2175-3369.010.002.ao09
Deadly Rio de Janeiro: Armed Violence and the Civilian Burden | ACLED. (2023, February 14). ACLED. https://acleddata.com/2023/02/14/deadly-rio-de-janeiro-armed-violence-and-the-civilian-burden/
Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. (2023). Global Organized Crime Index. In https://ocindex.net/2023/
Human Rights Watch. (2019, January 17). Brazil. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/brazil
Magaloni, B., Franco-Vivanco, E., & Melo, V. (2020). Killing in the Slums: Social Order, Criminal Governance, and Police Violence in Rio de Janeiro. American Political Science Review, 114(2), 552–572. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055419000856
Pinheiro & Sales, 2022. Plano de Ação Popular do CPX : Agenda 2030. https://wikifavelas.com.br/images/e/e0/PLANO-POPULAR-DO-CPX_VERS%C3%83O-FINALIZADA.pdf
Szpacenkopf, M. (2025, February 12). How a journalistic investigation mapped the influence of organized crime on politics in Brazil. LatAm Journalism Review by the Knight Center. https://latamjournalismreview.org/articles/how-a-journalistic-investigation-mapped-the-influence-of-organized-crime-on-politics-in-brazil/
Tank, A. (2024). Democracy and organized crime: the case of Brazil [Student Research Submissions 564]. University of Mary Washington. https://scholar.umw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1628&context=student_research